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"BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
to require the performance of a "meaningless ritual" by enforcing a legislative
mandate which is intended to protect a different class of people. A point in the
dissent's favor would be those cases where the driver's license has merely been
suspended and not revoked. In this situation the driver, who has an expectancy
of the reinstatement of his license, certainly has something to lose by not having
the instruction read.
Evidence-Circumstantial
In People v. Leyra4 ° the defendant was again convicted of murder in the
first degree after reversals of two previous convictions.41 In the third trial Leyra
was convicted on circumstantial evidence based on his remarks to the interrogat-
ing officer, after examining a. photograph of the murder room and noticing that
a chair was out of place which meant that he was present. The prosecution further
introduced as evidence Leyra's allegedly fabricated alibi, that at the time of the
murder he was asleep in his mistress's apartment, the disappearance of his overcoat
and his false explanation concerning the purchase of a new suit, raincoat and shoes.
The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction saying that the circumstantial
evidence was insufficient to support a conviction. The sufficiency of circumstantial
evidence depends upon whether the proof logically points to the defendant's guilt
and excludes, to a moral certainty, every other reasonable hypothesis, that is,
whether the proven facts are consistent with and point to defendant's guilt and
are inconsistant with his innocence. 42 In such circumstances, the facts from which
the inferences are to be drawn must be established by direct proof: the inferences
may not be based on conjecture, supposition, suggestion, speculation or upon other
inferences and the conclusion sought must flow naturally from the proven facts.
43
The assertion of false explanations or alibis as well as the destruction or
concealment of evidence comes within the broad category of conduct evidencing
a conciousness of guilt and, therefore, is admissible and relevant on the question
of a defendant's guilt in prosecution for murder.44 However in cases where con-
victions resulted from the use of such evidence to show consciousness of guilt, it
40. People v. Leyra, 1 N. Y. 2d 199, 134 N. E. 2d 475 (1956).
41. People v. Leyra, 302 N. Y. 353, 98 N. E. 2d 553 (1951). The defendant
was taken to a "wired" room where he was questioned by a psychiatrist and
subsequently confessed. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction of the
first trial on the ground that the confession made to the psychiatrist was the
product of mental and psychological coercion. On retrial, the defendant was
convicted solely on the basis of several other confessions made shortly after the
confession to the psychiatrist. The Supreme Court invalidated the conviction,
holding that the subsequent confessions, being "simply parts of one continuous
process", were tainted by the same poison that invalidated the prior confession.
Leyra v. Denno, 347 U. S. 556 (1954).
42. People v. Harris, 306 N. Y. 348, 118 N. E. 2d 470 (1954).
43. People v. Weiss, 290 N. Y. 160, 48 N. E. 2d 306 (1943).
44. 1 WHARTON CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 207, 209 (12th ed. 1955).
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was used only for purposes of lending strength to other and more tangible
evidence.45
In this case there was no other and more tangible evidence, but merely the
vague and inconclusive statement that defendant made to the interrogating
officer,40 which was made under the strain of continual interrogation, coupled with
severe sinus pains and emotional instability resulting from shock over the recent
murder of his parents. Under these circumstances the inferences from such admis-
sions tend to show that defendant was troubled, distracted, floundering and
confused, searching for an explanation to an unknown question. It was not the
kind of unequivocal and conclusive statement which would give rise to strong,
logical inferences of defendant's guilt.. The inferences drawn by the jury were
not grounded on concrete and directly proved facts but were based on conjecture
and therefore the Court of Appeals rightly reversed the conviction.
Evidence-False Testimony of Witness
In People v. Savvides,47 a witness for the prosecution falsely testified that no
agreement existed between him and the District Attorney under which he was to
receive lenient tratmeni in return for his testimony against the Defendant. The
Court of Appeals held that it was substantial and reversible error for the District
Attorney not to have exposed this lie.48
The fact that the falsehood bore upon the credibility of the witness rather
than the defendant's guilt is immaterial. Nor does the quantum of evidence indi-
cating the Defendant's guilt make this error insubstantial. "It is for jurors, not
judges of an appellate court such as ours, to decide the issue of guilt."49
The Court, taking a dim view of the ultimate value of such agreements,
points out that its revelation to the jury would have had substantial bearing on
their determination of the witness' veracity. The agreement in itself could suggest
to the jury that the witness' testimony could well exceed the bounds of veracity
in order to put himself in a better position. Further, the knowledge that the witness
had deliberately lied under oath would have lowered the jury's estimate of his
regard for the truth.
Thus where a witness for the prosecution falsely testifies to the existence of
an agreement between himself and the prosecuting attorney, it is incumbent upon
the prosecuting attorney to reveal this lie.
45. Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295 (Mass. 1850).
46. You know what that means Captain? It means me. Who else could it be?
47. 1 N. Y. 2d 554, 136 N. E. 2d 853 (1956).
48. Accord, People v. Creasy, 236 N. Y. 205, 221, 140 N. E. 563, 569 (1923).
49. People v. Mleczko, 298 N. Y. 153, 163, 81 N. E. 2d 65, 70 (1948).
